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MISSED OPPORTUNITY:  FURTHERING 
FAIR HOUSING IN THE HOUSING 




The premier rental housing program created in part to reduce isolation of 
low-income renters is marked by a series of missed opportunities to provide 
expanded housing choice and upward socioeconomic mobility for those harmed 
by racial and economic segregation. From the outset, the Housing Choice 
Voucher (HCV) Program was beset by widely recognized structural flaws 
limiting housing choice, which have persisted for decades. The use of vouchers 
to assist families displaced by wide-scale public-housing demolitions and 
disasters such as Hurricane Katrina exemplifies that the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) never structured the 
program to address segregation, deconcentrate low-income persons, expand 
housing choice, or further fair housing. HUD’s issuance of a new Fair Housing 
Act (FHA) rule, designed to affirmatively further fair housing, explicitly 
imposes detailed fair housing planning obligations on the public-housing 
authorities (PHAs) that administer voucher programs. These obligations 
provide the potential, yet again, for the HCV Program to achieve its intended 
purpose and expand housing choice for all. 
Part I of the article describes the HCV Program’s structure, purpose, and 
failure to fulfill its potential for expanding housing choice. In particular, part I 
discusses several structural flaws known by HUD since the program’s inception, 
including failure to establish neighborhood-level rents, failure to administer the 
HCV Program regionally, failure to require that program participants be 
informed about housing choices, and general failure to affirmatively further fair 
housing in the HCV Program. Part II discusses the role of informed housing 
choice in transforming the HCV from a short-term instrument of survival to a 
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long-term tool of opportunity. Part III conducts a case study using the dramatic 
expansion of HCV use in post-Katrina New Orleans following the hurricanes 
and accelerated public housing demolitions; this case study examines the 
clustering of vouchers and the extent to which the HCV Program delivers 
housing choice in a nondiscriminatory manner. Part V proposes tools for 
reforming the historical flaws in the HCV Program to affirmatively further fair 
housing. 
II 
THE UNTAPPED POTENTIAL OF HOUSING VOUCHERS TO EXPAND HOUSING 
CHOICE AND COMBAT EXISTING SEGREGATION 
Affordable housing strategies include both “supply-side” and “demand-
side” approaches.1 The HCV Program is a demand-side approach relying on the 
private market to rent to low-income tenants in exchange for a subsidy. Supply-
side approaches include building hard units of public housing administered by 
public-housing authorities, or creating tax incentives for private developers to 
build affordable units. Both approaches are necessary for a comprehensive 
affordable housing strategy that furthers fair housing and promotes inclusive 
communities. 
The HCV Program is the largest national rental assistance program.2 The 
structure of the program has remained essentially the same since Congress 
created it in 1974 as the Section 8 Existing Housing Program.3 The HCV 
Program is administered by local PHAs. Participants are responsible for finding 
suitable housing in the private market and must pay at least thirty percent of 
their monthly adjusted gross income on rent and utilities. The PHA pays a 
subsidy to the landlord to help cover the difference between what the tenant 
can afford and the payment standard—what the PHA considers a reasonable 
rent.4 The typical voucher household is very low-income at twenty-two percent 
of the area median.5 
 
 
 1. See JILL KHADDURI, KIMBERLY BURNETT & DAVID RODDA, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & 
URBAN DEV., TARGETING HOUSING PRODUCTION SUBSIDIES, LITERATURE REVIEW 3 (2003), 
https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/targetinglitreview.pdf. 
 2. CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, LOUISIANA FACT SHEET: THE HOUSING CHOICE 
VOUCHER PROGRAM (2015), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-10-14hous-factsheets 
_la.pdf (last updated July 6, 2015). 
 3. INGRID GOULD ELLEN & JESSICA YAGER, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., RACE, 
POVERTY, AND FEDERAL RENTAL HOUSING POLICY, HUD AT 50: CREATING PATHWAYS TO 
OPPORTUNITY 103, 106 (2015), https://www.huduser.gov/hud50th/HUDat50Book.pdf. 
 4. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV. (HUD), HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS FACT 
SHEET (2015), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/housing_choice_voucher_program 
_section_8. 
 5. Kirk McClure, Which Metropolitan Areas Work Best for Poverty Deconcentration with Housing 
Choice Vouchers?, 15 CITYSCAPE 209, 210 (2013), http://www.huduser.org/portal/periodicals/cityscpe/ 
vol15num3/ch15.pdf. 
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The HCV Program, as the current name suggests, provides the potential for 
greater housing choice and socioeconomic mobility for low-income families that 
participate. Vouchers create the possibility that families, armed with data and 
information, can exercise choices about where to live. By extension, such 
choices might open up areas of greater opportunity for families than 
traditionally available to them, such as neighborhoods with fewer 
environmental and health hazards, higher quality schools, and job growth. 
Indeed, an objective of the 1974 Act authorizing the Section 8 program includes 
“the reduction of the isolation of income groups within communities and 
geographical areas and the promotion of an increase in the diversity and vitality 
of neighborhoods through the spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities 
for persons of lower income. . . .”6 
Despite its purpose, the HCV Program on the whole fails to deconcentrate 
voucher families or give them access to opportunity. Voucher families live near 
lower performing schools than low-income families receiving no housing 
assistance at all.7 A national study examining voucher use in the fifty most 
populous metro areas from 2000 to 2008 finds that “households using vouchers 
are more economically and racially segregated than an extremely low-income 
comparison group.”8 Although the expansion of voucher use nationally has 
been tied to the idea of poverty deconcentration, studies have shown that 
voucher programs frequently perpetuate the poverty and racial concentration 
they are intended to challenge.9 
In fact, the HCV Program is not even structured to ensure poverty 
deconcentration, especially for minority households.10 From the outset, HUD 
incorporated, and later failed to remedy, structural features in the Section 8 
program that undermined Congress’s explicit goal of reducing isolation of 
income groups in the program. These structural features also failed to further 
fair housing by compromising housing choice and perpetuating racial and 
economic segregation.11 These features include the creation of a single-voucher 
payment standard for an entire region, which steered voucher families to the 
lowest-cost neighborhoods; the failure to ensure regional administration of 
 
 6. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 (HCDA), 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c)(6) (1999). 
 7. Ellen & Yager, supra note 3, at 114.  
 8. Molly W. Metzger, The Reconcentration of Poverty: Patterns of Housing Voucher Use, 2000 to 
2008, 24 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 544, 544 (2014). 
 9. See id.; Florence Wagman Roisman, Keeping the Promise: Ending Racial Discrimination and 
Segregation in Federally Financed Housing, 48 HOW. L.J. 913, 925-26 (2005) (“[U]se of Section 8 for 
desegregation and deconcentration has been very rare.”); see also Elizabeth Julian, “Deconcentration” 
as Policy: HUD and Housing Policy in the 1990s, The Nimby Report 5 (March 2004) (“While the tenant 
based Section 8 program established in the mid-1970s theoretically offered an opportunity for low 
income families to escape concentrated poverty, such an opportunity was never the reality for minority 
families.”).  
 10. See Kirk McClure, Alex F. Schwartz & Lydia B. Taghavi, Housing Choice Voucher Location 
Patterns a Decade Later, 25 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 215, 215, 233 (2015). 
 11. See infra Section I.D. 
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vouchers or facilitate freedom of movement throughout the region; the failure 
to require counseling and search assistance to help voucher families make 
informed housing choices based on data and other information related to 
neighborhood opportunity; and the failure to ensure that voucher programs 
complied with the affirmative mandates of the FHA.12 
A. Regional Fair Market Rents for Vouchers Limit Housing Choice 
HUD has traditionally determined the payment standard for the HCV 
Program by setting a single “fair market rent” at the fortieth or fiftieth 
percentile of rents for the entire metropolitan area.13 The structure of the rent-
payment standard is an impediment to housing choice because it steers voucher 
holders to the lowest-income neighborhoods in a metropolitan region.14 The 
flaws in the regional payment standard have not come to light in recent years; 
HUD has been aware of them for decades.15 
In 1977, the Comptroller General issued a Report to the Congress entitled 
“Major Changes are Needed in the New Leased-Housing Program.”16 The 
problems noted as hindering the program included setting fair market rents 
(FMR) “too low for program success.”17 The report specifically noted that 
“HUD’s decision to prepare single FMR schedules for entire [metropolitan 
areas] is questionable. [This decision] ignores important distinctions between 
metropolitan central cities and suburban areas as well as among suburban 
areas . . . .”18 In this regard, the report recommended that HUD “develop 
separate FMR schedules for individual housing submarket areas instead of one 
FMR schedule for an entire [metro area or county group]. . . .”19 
Despite a recommendation in 1977 that HUD alter its method of setting 
rents for the HCV Program, HUD did not remedy this impediment to housing 
choice until 2010 in response to litigation. A Dallas civil rights organization, the 
Inclusive Communities Project (ICP), filed a complaint in 2007 challenging 
HUD’s method of setting a single fair market rent for the twelve-county metro 
Dallas region as steering black Section 8 participants into predominantly 
minority areas.20 HUD then announced a demonstration project in which it 
would set rents according to “small areas” in certain selected metropolitan 
 
 12. See infra Sections I.A–D. 
 13. Ellen & Yager, supra note 3, at 106 (also stating the payment standard is calculated at 90 to 110 
percent of the fair market rent).  
 14. Id. at 116. 
 15. See infra notes 16–19 and accompanying text. 
 16. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, B-171630, MAJOR CHANGES ARE NEEDED IN THE NEW 
LEASED-HOUSING PROGRAM (1977). 
 17. Id. at 1. 
 18. Id. at 21. 
 19. Id. at 29. 
 20. Complaint at 25, Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. United States Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, No. 3-07CV0945 (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2007). The author is a member of the 
Board of Directors of ICP. 
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regions, including Dallas.21 In its announcement of the demonstration project, 
HUD stated that it expected “small area FMRs [to] provide Section 8 tenants 
with greater ability to move into opportunity areas where jobs, transportation, 
and educational opportunities exist, and prevent undue subsidy in lower-rent 
areas.”22  
A key obstacle to addressing the payment standard is the assumption that 
increased rents in high-opportunity areas would increase net program costs and 
limit the number of households able to participate in the program. This tension 
between maximizing the number of people served, regardless of location, and 
maximizing choice and access to high-opportunity neighborhoods runs 
throughout HUD’s housing programs.23 A recent study of the Dallas 
demonstration project, however, found that “zip code-level rent ceilings causes 
rent increases in expensive neighborhoods and decreases in low-cost 
neighborhoods, with little change in aggregate rents.”24 Moreover, the study’s 
authors noted that while generic rent increases in the voucher program 
primarily benefited landlords without improving neighborhood quality, a “ZIP 
code policy improves neighborhood quality for voucher recipients 
substantially.”25 Thus, despite the misnomer of the metro-wide “fair market” 
rent, it appears HUD has been paying premium rent in low-cost neighborhoods 
and below-market rent in high-opportunity neighborhoods. 
HUD issued a Proposed Rule on June 16, 2016, proposing the use of Small 
Area FMRs in place of the current single FMR approach in certain 
metropolitan areas.26 These small-area FMRs are designed “to address high 
levels of voucher concentration” and “to provide HCV tenants with a greater 
ability to move into areas where jobs, transportation, and educational 
opportunities exist.”27  
 
 21. Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program—Notice of Demonstration Project, 75 Fed. Reg. 
27,808, 27,809 (May 18, 2010); see also Proposed Fair Market Rents for the Housing Choice Voucher 
Program and Moderate Rehabilitation Single Room Occupancy Program Fiscal Year 2011, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 46958 (August 4, 2010).  
 22. 75 Fed. Reg. at 27,808. After the demonstration program in which voucher rents were set by zip 
code ended, ICP challenged HUD’s subsequent decision to decrease rents in white-area zip codes and 
to increase rents in zip codes with high poverty rates. See Complaint at ¶ 2, Inclusive Communities 
Project, Inc. v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, No. 14-cv-01465 (N.D. 
Tex. Apr. 22, 2014).  
 23. Ellen & Yager, supra note 3, at 104. 
 24. ROBERT A. COLLINSON & PETER GANONG, THE INCIDENCE OF HOUSING VOUCHER 
GENEROSITY (2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2255799. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System; Using Small Area Fair Market Rents 
in Housing Choice Voucher Program Instead of the Current 50th Percentile FMRs, Proposed Rule, 81 
Fed. Reg. 39,218 (June 16, 2016). 
 27. Id. 
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B. The HCV Program Lacks Regional Administration and Fails to Promote 
Regional Mobility 
The irony of the regional “fair market rent” approach is that traditionally 
there is nothing regional about housing voucher administration. The voucher 
programs are administered by local city and county housing authorities 
operating within submarkets of a region, subjecting households to bureaucratic 
obstacles and duplicative requirements when they want to cross jurisdictional 
lines between city and suburb or between suburbs.28 HUD has been aware of 
the potential benefits of regional voucher administration for decades.29 The 
Comptroller General recommended regional administration of the voucher 
program in its 1977 report, encouraging “the formation of PHAs with regional, 
metropolitan, and/or State-wide jurisdiction to give certificate holders greater 
mobility and freedom of choice within market areas.”30 In addition to the fair 
housing benefits of regional voucher administration, the 1977 report also noted 
the economic efficiencies of “aggregat[ing] allocations for several communities 
or jurisdictions [so as to create] a PHA with area-wide responsibility.”31 In the 
years ahead, HUD will operate in an increasingly tight fiscal environment, 
lending greater urgency to “regional collaboration and pooling of resources 
among housing authorities” to achieve “economies of scale.”32 In the summer of 
2014, HUD issued a proposed rule that seeks to increase administrative 
efficiencies for PHAs to form consortia for the purpose of administering 
voucher programs.33 The proposed rule is designed to maximize resident 
housing choice by removing administrative burdens associated with using 
vouchers across jurisdictional lines within a region.34 This is a positive 
development, but without concrete incentives, it is unclear whether PHAs will 
volunteer to collaborate with one another. 
C. No Requirement to Inform Voucher Families of Their Housing Choices 
There is no requirement that counseling be provided to inform voucher 
households of the myriad characteristics of neighborhoods within a region, 
including: educational options and quality measures assigned to public schools; 
employment and transportation resources; demographic information, such as 
 
 28. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 16, at 45 (“A family that wishes greater mobility . . . 
will have to qualify and be certified in each PHA jurisdiction in which it plans to shop for housing and 
will have to fulfill a number of duplicative requirements . . .”); see also Ellen & Yager, supra note 3, at 
125 (recommending greater portability of vouchers). 
 29. See infra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 30. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 16, at 56. 
 31. Id. at 55. 
 32. Ellen & Yager, supra note 3, at 124 (noting the fair housing benefits of regional collaboration 
among housing authorities).  
 33. Streamlining Requirements Applicable to Formation of Consortia by Public Housing Agencies, 
79 Fed. Reg. 40,019, 40,020 (July 11, 2014). 
 34. Id. at 40,021. 
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poverty rates; environmental quality and public safety features; and social 
supports.35 Yet HUD has known for decades that “choice” is dependent on 
information. The Comptroller General recommended in its 1977 Report that 
PHAs “promote greater choice of housing by . . . advising families of their 
opportunity to lease housing in [all areas in which the PHA is not legally barred 
from entering contracts] . . . .”36 
The housing counseling “mobility” programs initially arose from litigation, 
the first being the Gautreaux program in Chicago created in 1976 by consent 
decree.37 More recently, programs have emerged in Dallas and Baltimore.38 
HUD initiated research demonstrations motivated by the early, positive 
Gautreaux findings.39 The mobility programs have generally coupled counseling 
and search assistance with special-purpose housing vouchers available for use in 
neighborhoods that are low poverty or less racially segregated.40 
Pre-move mobility counseling increases the ability of voucher families to 
find housing in low-poverty neighborhoods and post-move counseling helps 
families remain there.41 In HUD’s Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing 
(MTO) research demonstration, families with no search assistance or housing 
counseling moved to neighborhoods with “significantly higher poverty and 
crime rates” compared with families who received assistance and were 
restricted to using vouchers in low-poverty areas.42 Experts recommend that 
pre-move counseling “should seek the best-possible initial placements for 
families, not the quickest placements.”43 Post-move counseling can target 
problems with landlords and units, which constituted the major causes of 
tenants leaving units in the MTO program.44 Nationally, both black and white 
families exit poor neighborhoods over time, but black families are “much more 
likely to fall back into poor areas through subsequent moves.”45 
A vast array of literature documents the link between neighborhoods, 
physical and mental health, and life prospects.46 Early research of the Gautreaux 
 
 35. See Ellen & Yager, supra note 3, at 125 (recommending a requirement that neighborhood 
information be provided to voucher holders).  
 36. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 16, at 44. 
 37. Alexander Polikoff, Racial Inequality and the Black Ghetto, 1 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 10 
(2006). 
 38. See infra notes 91, 94, 95, 97 and accompanying text. 
 39. Ellen & Yager, supra note 3, at 115. 
 40. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER & SUSAN J. POPKIN, URBAN INSTITUTE, WHY HOUSING CHOICE 
AND MOBILITY MATTER (2010). But see Xavier de Souza Briggs & Margery Austin Turner, Assisted 
Housing Mobility and the Success of Low-Income Minority Families: Lessons for Policy, Practice, and 
Future Research, 1 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 25, 58 (2006) (noting that some families may be better 
served by services addressing readiness to move rather than by mobility counseling). 
 41. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 39–41. 
 42. Id. at 33. 
 43. Id. at 40. 
 44. Id. at 41. 
 45. Id. at 39. 
 46. XAVIER DE SOUZA BRIGGS, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION PRESS, THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
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program documented that families who moved to suburban, resource-rich 
Chicago neighborhoods achieved meaningful gains in education, employment, 
and long-term earnings.47 For example, children in the Gautreaux mobility 
program who moved to suburbs were more likely than children from similar 
families moving within Chicago to complete high school, take college-track 
courses, attend college, and enter the work force.48 More recent research shows 
that Gautreaux women who moved to integrated, resource-rich neighborhoods 
spent significantly more time employed and considerably less time on welfare.49 
In the MTO demonstration of the mid-1990s, HUD provided mobility 
counseling and search assistance to families living in public and assisted housing 
projects—in Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York—who 
agreed to use vouchers in census tracts with poverty rates below ten percent.50 
The most substantial findings relate to improvements in physical and mental 
health and perceptions of safety for women and adolescent girls. In particular, 
women and girls “enjoyed significant improvements in mental health, including 
reductions in psychological distress and depression and increasing feelings of 
calm and peacefulness.”51 Qualitative research suggests that escaping from 
environments in which adolescent girls were targets for sexual harassment and 
pressure “appears to offer a tremendous sense of relief and freedom,”52 
contributing to short-term health and well-being as well as potential long-term 
benefits, such as staying in school. Participants in the MTO demonstration cited 
the desire to escape unsafe places as their primary motivation for moving.53 
Although an interim evaluation found no evidence that MTO contributed to 
significant educational, employment, or earnings gains, and further indicated 
that MTO boys did not share the benefits enjoyed by MTO girls,54 more recent 
evidence gathered from tax returns shows that MTO children who were 
younger than age thirteen when their families moved to lower-poverty 
neighborhoods experienced significant improvements in college attendance 
rates and earnings.55 The study finds that “every year spent in a better area 
during childhood increases college attendance rates and earnings in adulthood”; 
 
OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 7 (2015). 
 47. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 45.  
 48. James E. Rosenbaum, Changing the Geography of Opportunity by Expanding Residential 
Choice: Lessons from the Gautreaux Program, 6 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 231, 263–64 (1995). 
 49. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 48–49. 
 50. Turner & Popkin, supra note 40, at 4. 
 51. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 45. The research also noted significant reductions in rates of 
adult obesity. Id. 
 52. Id. at 48. 
 53. Id. at 49. 
 54. Turner & Popkin, supra note 40, at 5 (few MTO families moved to suburbs or integrated 
neighborhoods and few stayed in low-poverty neighborhoods). 
 55. RAJ CHETTY, NATHANIEL HENDREN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE 
TO BETTER NEIGHBORHOODS ON CHILDREN: NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY 
EXPERIMENT 23 (2015), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hendren/files/mto_paper.pdf.  
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this finding is “consistent with recent evidence that the duration of exposure to 
a better environment during childhood is a key determinant of an individual’s 
long-term outcomes.”56 The mobility research confirms what many already 
know about housing opportunity: it is linked to many other kinds of 
transformative life opportunities. 
D. Government Failure to Affirmatively Further Fair Housing in the HCV 
Program 
The FHA has always obligated PHAs, as HUD program participants, not 
only to refrain from discrimination, but also to “take actions to address 
segregation and related barriers . . . as often reflected in racially or ethnically 
concentrated areas of poverty.”57 HUD has been aware of the structural barriers 
to housing choice in the voucher program for decades.58 In 1977, the Office of 
the Comptroller General in its Report to Congress specifically discussed 
“Impediments to Furthering the Deconcentration Goal” of the Act authorizing 
the Section 8 program.59 After describing the voucher program as “the major 
vehicle for deconcentration,” the Report reiterated the role that low FMRs 
played in restrict[ing] shoppers’ choices to housing of marginal quality in 
minority and lower income areas.”60 Although some officials stated they would 
not approve leasing units in “blighted areas, high-crime areas, and areas 
characterized by air pollution, rodent infestation, and other serious 
environmental deficiencies,” others saw “little choice” but to approve leases in 
these blighted neighborhoods so long as the units met the program’s “quality” 
standards.61 
A year later, in 1978, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed 
whether HUD’s administration of the Section 8 program was achieving the 
legislative objective of reducing isolation and deconcentrating housing for low-
income persons.62 The GAO made three key findings: 
 
1. Key HUD housing and community development personnel are not sure 
whether deconcentration is a prime objective of the Section 8 program, 
2. HUD has provided little formal direction in defining deconcentration or 
in establishing procedures to achieve it, and 
 
 
 56. Id.  
 57. Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,274 (July 16, 
2015). 
 58. See infra notes 59–65 and accompanying text. 
 59. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 16, at 42–45. 
 60. Id. at 43. 
 61. Id. at 43–44. 
 62. Letter from the Director of the U.S. General Accounting Office to the Secretary of Housing 
and Urban Development, B-17163 (Oct. 20, 1978), http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/124496.pdf.   
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3. the extent of deconcentration achieved through the Section 8 program is 
not readily determinable because HUD has not developed the criteria 
needed to measure this factor.63 
 
The GAO recommended that HUD clearly define the deconcentration 
objective of the Section 8 program, issue guidelines to assist field offices to meet 
the objective, and develop a system for measuring results that would include 
measurement criteria, goals, and data-collection mechanisms.64 One of the most 
notable recommendations in the 1978 letter was the warning that “steps should 
be taken now, before substantial numbers of units are occupied.”65 
Although HUD has undertaken some demonstration programs,66 it has 
resisted the kind of structural change required to remove barriers to housing 
choice in the voucher program.67 In July 2015, however, HUD issued a Final 
Rule interpreting its obligation to ensure that its programs and activities be 
administered in a manner that affirmatively furthers fair housing.68 This Rule is 
much-anticipated, comprehensive regulatory guidance “designed to improve 
the fair housing planning process by providing better data and greater clarity to 
the steps that program participants must undertake “ to meet their affirmative 
fair housing mandates.69 The purpose of the new Rule is to “aid program 
participants in taking meaningful actions to overcome historic patterns of 
segregation, promote fair housing choice, and foster inclusive communities that 
are free from discrimination.”70 This purpose closely mirrors HUD’s definition 
of affirmatively furthering fair housing.71  
In the new Rule, HUD has replaced the requirement that grantees prepare 
an analysis of impediments with the Assessment of Fair Housing (AFH). HUD 
commits to provide all stakeholders, including PHAs, “with local and regional 
data on patterns of integration and segregation, racially or ethnically 
concentrated areas of poverty, access to housing and key community assets that 
afford opportunity [including education, employment, low-poverty 
neighborhoods, transportation, and environmental health], and 
 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Ellen & Yager, supra note 3, at 115 (discussing the Regional Opportunity Counseling 
Program of 1997); see also, e.g., U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 16, at 57–58.  
 67. See, e.g., Robert Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated Housing: A Back-to-
the-Future Reflection on the Fair Housing Act’s “Affirmatively Further” Mandate, 100 KY. L.J. 125 
(2012) (comprehensively reviewing HUD’s AFFH regulations, guidance, enforcement, and inaction 
leading up to the new rule). 
 68. Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (July 16, 2015). The 
obligation to affirmatively further fair housing applies to all executive branch departments and agencies 
administering housing and urban development programs. Id; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3608.   
 69. Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,273.  
 70. 24 C.F.R. § 5.150 (2015). 
 71. 24 C.F.R. § 5.152 (2015). 
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disproportionate housing needs” of groups protected by the FHA.72 HUD will 
provide data and an assessment tool tailored to each category of program 
participant.73 
Since 1998, PHAs have had to certify in their annual plans that they will 
affirmatively further fair housing,74 and they must continue to do so under the 
new Rule.75 The new certification means that the PHA will take meaningful 
actions to further the goals in the AFH and “that it will take no action that is 
materially inconsistent with its obligation to affirmatively further fair 
housing.”76 A PHA will be in compliance with its Affirmatively Furthering Fair 
Housing Rule77 certification if it examines its programs, identifies fair housing 
issues and contributing factors within its programs, specifies actions and 
strategies to address those as well as AFH goals (in a reasonable manner in 
light of available resources), works with jurisdictions on the Rule’s initiatives 
requiring PHA involvement, and maintains corresponding records.78 In a 
response to public comment, HUD recognizes “lack of information about 
housing opportunities in more affluent or diverse neighborhoods” as an 
impediment that limits choice.79 The new Rule requires for the first time both 
that PHAs prepare an AFH every five years and that they incorporate 
strategies and actions furthering fair housing into their Annual Plans.80 PHAs 
may, and are encouraged to, collaborate on their AFH’s with other program 
participants, such as local and state governments, regional entities, and other 
PHAs.81 
As HUD makes explicit, the duty to affirmatively further fair housing is 
statutory—“not an administrative requirement that can be waived by HUD.”82 
HUD may reject an AFH if it finds that it is “inconsistent with fair housing or 
civil rights requirements or is substantially incomplete.”83 One expert 
characterizes the Rule, however, as “long on ‘carrots’ but painfully short on 
‘sticks,’” such that the mandate will be realized “only in communities where 
 
 72. Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,348. 
 73. 24 C.F.R. § 5.154(d) (2015). 
 74. See Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,274 n.3 (detailing 
statutory planning and certification requirements). 
 75. 24 C.F.R. § 903.7(o) (2015). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,308. 
 78. 24 C.F.R. § 903.7(o)(3) (2015). 
 79. Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,308. HUD notes that 
PHAs are already scored on factors promoting choice relating to landlord outreach and tenant 
counseling activities. Id. These activities should not be merely incentivized, but required. See id.  
 80. 24 C.F.R. § 5.154(d)(5) (2015). HUD notes that prior analyses of impediments were not 
coordinated with the PHA Annual Plans. Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. 
Reg. at 42,348.  
 81. 24 C.F.R. §§ 5.156; 903.15 (2015). 
 82. Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,348. 
 83. 24 C.F.R. §5.162(b) (2015). 
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grassroots and legal advocates mobilize and create their own enforcement 
strategies.”84 Even then, the new Rule maintains the enduring reality that “the 
key to current enforcement of [affirmative fair housing] mandates lies with 
HUD, either through action prompted by a lawsuit, a privately initiated 
administrative complaint to HUD under the FHA, or on HUD’s own 
initiative.”85 The problem is that HUD’s “civil rights record has been timid at 
best and [it] has often viewed its main stakeholders as the very local-
government grantees whose exclusionary policies must be changed.”86 The Rule 
encourages positive development, however, in the context of voucher 
administration; PHAs, like all federal grant recipients, “will be required to have 
an honest conversation about segregation and devise a local plan to dismantle 
it.”87 
III 
HOUSING CHOICE FOR ALL? 
The housing choices and mobility of African Americans are uniquely 
fraught and politicized. Yet policy debates about which housing choices are best 
miss the larger point that low-income households of color historically have had 
minimal neighborhood choice and mobility in the marketplace.88 Expanding fair 
housing choice is aimed at reducing economic, racial, and social isolation; 
increasing freedom of movement; and creating a more balanced menu of 
housing options for all families. Fair housing is informed choice; it is not 
presumptive of any particular choice.89 
As noted by housing researchers and policy analysts, “Contrary to the 
skepticism that the minority poor strongly prefer to live among ‘their own,’ 
many low-income families . . . will volunteer for the opportunity to move from 
high-poverty areas, typically inner cities, to better neighborhoods in the same 
cities or in the surrounding suburbs.”90 Many housing-mobility counseling 
programs document far greater demand for their programs than available 
openings. For example, 13,000 households applied for just 2,000 restricted 
vouchers offered through a litigation-born mobility program in the Baltimore 
 
 84. MICHAEL ALLEN, FURMAN CENTER FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POLICY, HUD’S NEW 
AFFH RULE: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GROUND GAME  (Sept. 2015), http://furmancenter.org/ 
research/iri/essay/huds-new-affh-rule-the-importance-of-the-ground-game.  
 85. Schwemm, supra note 67, at 166. 
 86. Id. at 176. 
 87. Allen, supra note 84. 
 88. See supra notes 35–36; 58–61 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 95–97 and 
accompanying text. 
 89. See Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,354; 24 C.F.R. 
§5.152 (2015) (stating that HUD defines choice to include actual choice, protected choice, and 
“[e]nabled choice, which means realistic access to sufficient information regarding options so that any 
choice is informed”).  
 90. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 31–32.   
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region;91 the Gautreaux program applicants far exceeded program capacity for 
most of the program’s operation.92 Whereas families who were involuntarily 
displaced through public-housing demolition programs such as HOPE VI 
reported a loss of supportive ties, other families who participated, presumably 
voluntarily, in mobility programs reported no support networks at all in their 
starting-point neighborhoods and weak links to institutions there.93 One woman 
who chose to participate in the Dallas mobility program admitted she had not 
yet built a social network in her new suburban neighborhood, but neither had 
she heard a gunshot: “‘I’m going to stay out here,’ she said. ‘I’m not going 
back.’”94 
Scholars have found that low-income families’ perceptions of their housing 
options are shaped by years of living in public housing, concentrated poverty, 
and racial isolation, so they “tend to value housing units over neighborhood 
quality, because they spend much of their time in the home in order to ‘keep to 
themselves’ and avoid violence.”95 Research documents dramatic improvements 
in perceptions of neighborhood quality for families participating in assisted 
housing mobility efforts.96 As noted by one participant in the Baltimore 
Housing Mobility Program, which assists voucher holders to move from public-
housing neighborhoods to high-opportunity neighborhoods, “It’s only in leaving 
that I started growing and wanting to do different things, learn different things 
and be something different.”97 Depending on how it is used, therefore, the 
voucher can serve as a short-term instrument of survival or a long-term tool of 
opportunity. An examination of voucher use by families displaced by public-
housing demolitions and Hurricane Katrina illustrates this dichotomy. 
IV 
HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS AS A POST-KATRINA RECOVERY TOOL IN NEW 
ORLEANS: SHORT-TERM SURVIVAL OR LONG-TERM OPPORTUNITY? 
The significance of the HCV Program in the New Orleans metro area post-
Katrina cannot be overstated; the number of housing vouchers in use in Orleans 
Parish alone more than tripled from 2000 to 2010.98 Housing vouchers were a 
 
 91. Turner & Popkin, supra note 40, at 4. 
 92. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 32. 
 93. See Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 37 (noting that in the MTO research demonstration 
program, there was “no mean impact on social support for the experimental group as a whole”). 
 94. Binyamin Appelbaum, Vouchers Help Families Move Far From Public Housing, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 7, 2015, at A1.  
 95. Jennifer Darrah & Stefanie DeLuca, “Living Here Has Changed My Whole Perspective”: How 
Escaping Inner City Poverty Shapes Neighborhood and Housing Choice, 33 J. POL. ANALYSIS MGMT. 
350, 354 (2014).  
 96. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 43. 
 97. Stefanie DeLuca & Jessi Stafford, Finding Home: Voices of the Baltimore Housing Mobility 
Program, THE CENTURY FOUNDATION  (2014), http://apps.tcf.org/finding-home. 
 98. A Picture of Subsidized Households, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. (2000, 2010), 
http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/picture/about.html.  
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primary means of assisting households displaced by Katrina, especially 
following demolitions of public-housing units that housed over 5,000 low-
income households before the storm.99 Data regarding the use of housing 
vouchers by low-income renters is presented in the pre- and post-disaster New 
Orleans housing markets.100 The data presentation is followed by an analysis of 
market barriers to the use of housing vouchers and proposed tools for reform. 
A. The Role of Housing Vouchers in the Post-Katrina Recovery Landscape 
HUD reports 17,347 vouchers used in Orleans Parish in 2010, up from about 
8,400 in 2005 and 4,763 in 2000.101 In the entire metropolitan area (including 
Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. John the Baptist, 
and St. Tammany Parishes), there were 25,439 voucher households in 2010, 
compared with 7,978 in 2000.102 
Many former public-housing residents and other low-income households 
received housing vouchers after they were displaced by Katrina and the 
demolition of nearly 5,000 public-housing units.103 The public-housing 
developments demolished since Katrina have been rebuilt, but gradually, on a 
smaller scale, and in a mixed-income fashion, reducing the number of public-
housing units on-site to slightly more than 600.104 Housing administrators 
justified public-housing demolitions, which were underway even before the 
storm, based on high-poverty concentrations and poor living conditions pre-
Katrina.105 Meanwhile, the reliance on the private market to fill the affordable 
housing gap neglected to account for the post-disaster housing shortage—over 
fifty percent of New Orleans rental units were destroyed—and the reluctance of 
 
 99. Gwen Filosa, Demolition Approved for New Orleans’ Public Housing, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 
21, 2007), http://blog.nola.com/times-picayune/2007/09/demolition_approved_for_new_or.html. 
 100. See McClure, Schwartz & Taghavi, supra note 10, at 219-21 (explaining that privacy restrictions 
limit public access to voucher unit addresses). HUD makes available, and this article utilizes, the census 
tract locations where vouchers are being used. HUD provides 2010 voucher location data using census 
tracts drawn in 2000. Census tract locations do not provide the most granular picture of neighborhood 
conditions experienced by voucher households; census tracts may be too large to reveal the clustering 
of voucher households within the tracts. Nevertheless, the data do provide insight on broad patterns of 
occupancy and access to opportunity. 
 101. Picture of Subsidized Households, HUD, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/picture 
/yearlydata.html (compiling query data using year options 2000, 2004–2007, and 2010, Orleans Parish 
for the Summary Level option, and Housing Choice Vouchers for the Program option). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Filosa, supra note 99.  
 104. Katy Reckdahl, End of an Era for New Orleans Public Housing, NEW ORLEANS ADVOCATE 
(Feb. 27, 2014), http://theadvocate.com/news/neworleans/6625562-148/photos-iberville-demolition-
marks-end; Richard Webster, New Orleans Public Housing Remade after Katrina. Is it Working?, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.nola.com/katrina/index.ssf/2015/08/new_orleans_public_ 
housing_dem.html.  
 105. MARY AUSTIN TURNER, BARIKA X. WILLIAMS, GLENN KATES, SUSAN J. POPKIN & CAROL 
RABENHORST, URBAN INSTITUTE, AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING IN HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: 
REBUILDING AFTER HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA 8–9 (May 2007).  
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many jurisdictions to bring back, much less create new, rental housing.106 As 
noted in The New Orleans Index at Five, efforts to redevelop and reform 
affordable rental housing post-Katrina “d[id] not equal the scale of the housing 
lost or provide enough affordable homes to those who lost a home they could 
afford pre-Katrina.”107 It is difficult to determine exactly where the displaced 
low-income residents are using the vouchers now, but an analysis of voucher use 
in the metro area before and after Katrina provides some insight on this 
question. 
The transition from project-based (supply-side) rental assistance to tenant-
based (demand-side) assistance reflects a federal policy shift and is consistent 
with national trends. For example, from 1995 through 2012, approximately 
500,000 units of public housing and privately owned assisted housing were 
demolished or discontinued, whereas Congress funded 800,000 additional 
housing vouchers in the same period.108 As of 2012, there were 2.2 million 
households assisted with housing vouchers nationwide.109 
Wider housing choice may assist families with children, thirty-nine percent 
of whom lived in poverty in New Orleans in 2013, overcome the documented 
negative health effects of living in poverty. As noted in a recent report by The 
Data Center, “Scientific research shows that child poverty can lead to chronic, 
toxic stress that disrupts the architecture of the developing brain . . . ,” making 
poverty perhaps “the single greatest threat to children’s healthy brain 
development.”110 The HCV Program assists more families with children than all 
other HUD rental assistance programs combined.111 In Louisiana, over half of 
voucher households included children in 2014.112 
 
 106. Id. at 1 n.1; see, e.g., Stacy Seicshnaydre, How Government Housing Perpetuates Racial 
Segregation: Lessons from Post-Katrina New Orleans, 60 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 661 (2011) (discussing 
the failure to create new rental housing units after Hurricane Katrina). 
 107. Kalima Rose & Laura Tuggle, Community Action: Bringing People Home to Stronger 
Neighborhoods, THE NEW ORLEANS INDEX AT FIVE 7 (2010), https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/ 
files/NOLA_HOUSING_RECOVERY_2010.PDF. 
 108. BARBARA SARD & DOUGLAS RICE, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, CREATING 
OPPORTUNITY FOR CHILDREN: HOW HOUSING LOCATION CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE (2014), 
http://www.cbpp.org/research/creating-opportunity-for-children. 
 109. McClure, supra note 5, at 209. 
 110. VICKI MACK, THE DATA CTR., NEW ORLEANS KIDS, WORKING PARENTS, AND POVERTY 
(2015), www.datacenterresearch.org/reports_analysis/new-orleans-kids-working-parents-and-poverty/. 
 111. BARBARA SARD & THYRIA ALVAREZ-SANCHEZ, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES 
LARGE MAJORITY OF HOUSING VOUCHER RECIPIENTS WORK, ARE ELDERLY, OR HAVE 
DISABILITIES (2011), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/12-2-11hous.pdf. For a detailed 
analysis and set of recommendations regarding how housing vouchers can improve the housing choice 
and well-being of families with children, see generally Barbara Sard & Douglas Rice, Creating 
Opportunity for Children, How Housing Location Can Make a Difference (Oct. 15, 2014), 
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/10-15-14hous.pdf. 
 112. Louisiana Fact Sheet: The Housing Choice Voucher Program, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y 
PRIORITIES 1, http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-10-14hous-factsheets_la.pdf (last 
updated July 6, 2015). 
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B. Where Voucher Households Lived Pre-Katrina 
Prior to Katrina, voucher households in the New Orleans metro area, 
compared with their national counterparts, had less access to low-poverty 
neighborhoods and were more concentrated in extreme-poverty 
neighborhoods.113 HUD published a study in 2003 examining voucher location 
patterns in the top fifty metropolitan areas using 1998 voucher data and 1990 
census data.114 HUD found that nearly thirty percent of voucher households 
nationally lived in low-poverty neighborhoods.115 This compared to six percent 
of households in metro New Orleans.116 The HUD study also revealed that twice 
as many metro New Orleans voucher households (twenty-one percent) lived in 
neighborhoods of extreme poverty compared with their national counterparts 
(ten percent).117 
HUD’s study also revealed racial disparities in voucher household access to 
low-poverty neighborhoods, which credits the observation that “[b]y allowing 
them to live in more socioeconomically integrated settings, American society 
tends to afford the white poor a chance at upward mobility that it denies to 
many of its poor black and Latino citizens.”118 For example, nineteen percent of 
white voucher households used vouchers in low-poverty neighborhoods in 
metro New Orleans, compared with only six percent of black households. 
Conversely, the study reported that ten times as many black voucher 
households (twenty-one percent) used vouchers in neighborhoods of extreme 
poverty in metro New Orleans when compared with their white counterparts 
(two percent).119 
Although voucher households in pre-Katrina New Orleans were more 
concentrated in poor neighborhoods than their national counterparts, they were 
less concentrated by poverty when compared with families in public housing. In 
metro New Orleans, no public-housing families lived in low-poverty or even 
middle-class neighborhoods; eighty-three percent of families lived in  
 
 
 113. For purposes of this article, “low-poverty neighborhoods” refer to census tracts with less than 
ten percent of residents living below the poverty line. “Middle-class neighborhoods” refer to census 
tracts with less than twenty percent of residents living below the poverty line. “High-poverty 
neighborhoods” refer to census tracts with thirty percent or more residents living below the poverty 
line. “Extreme-poverty neighborhoods” will refer to census tracts with forty percent or more residents 
living below the poverty line. 
 114. DEBORAH J. DEVINE, ROBERT W. GRAY, LESTER RUBIN & LYDIA B. TAGHAVI, U.S. DEPT. 
OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., OFF. OF POL’Y DEV. & RES., HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER 
LOCATION PATTERNS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS AND NEIGHBORHOOD WELFARE (Jan. 
2003), http://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/location_paper.pdf. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. The national figures include only voucher households with children present. Id. at 31. 
 118. SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE 
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 246 (2004). 
 119. Devine, supra note 117, at 36 tbl. III-5.  
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neighborhoods of extreme poverty; and nearly all public-housing residents 
(ninety-seven percent) lived in high-poverty neighborhoods.120 
C. Where Voucher Households Lived Post-Katrina 
After Katrina, voucher households in the New Orleans metro area 
continued to have less access to low-poverty neighborhoods than their national 
counterparts, with notable clustering of Orleans Parish voucher users in certain 
census tracts.121 
1. Housing Voucher Use in Metro New Orleans 
A recent national study examining voucher household’s access to low-
poverty neighborhoods by metro area reported that nineteen percent of 
voucher households in 2010 were located in low-poverty metropolitan census 
tracts “with only very minimal encouragement . . .”122 The study describes this 
figure as “a baseline . . . under the standard administration of the HCV 
[Program].”123 By contrast, the study reports that nine percent of metro New 
Orleans voucher households used vouchers in low-poverty tracts in 2010.124 New 
Orleans in 2010 was in the bottom quartile of all U.S. metro areas with respect 
to voucher household access to low-poverty neighborhoods and among the five 
worst performing large metros (population greater than 800,000).125 The 
performance of New Orleans reflects a regional phenomenon. The south-
central region of the United States has the lowest average percentage of 
voucher holders living in low-poverty neighborhoods.126 However, the overall 
trend in the New Orleans metro is toward less poverty concentration, whereas 
the overall trend nationally is toward greater poverty concentration and less 
access to low-poverty neighborhoods for voucher holders.127 
Additionally, white voucher households in metro New Orleans in 2010 
continued to have much greater access to low-poverty neighborhoods than 
black voucher households: twenty-one percent of whites used vouchers in low 
poverty neighborhoods compared with only nine percent of blacks.128 By 
 
 120. Devine, supra note 117, at 40 tbl. III-9. See Turner & Popkin, supra note 40, at 2–3 for a 
discussion of national research tracking former public-housing residents using vouchers to relocate. 
 121. See infra notes 122–125; 132–134 and accompanying text. 
 122. McClure, supra note 5, at 216–17. 
 123. Id. at 217. 
 124. Id. at 231.  
 125. Id. at 217–20. 
 126. Id. at 218–19. 
 127. McClure, Schwartz & Taghavi, supra note 10, at 223-25. 
 128. McClure contributed additional data analysis for this case study relating to HCV use at the 
metro New Orleans level (on file with author). See A Picture of Subsidized Households, U.S. Dep’t of 
Hous. & Urban Dev. (2000, 2010), http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/picture/about.html; U.S. 
Census Bureau: Census 2010; Daniel H. Weinberg, U.S. Neighborhood Income Inequality in the 2005–
2009 Period, American Community Survey Reports, 2005–2009 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
2011pubs/acs-16.pdf.  
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contrast, six percent of whites used vouchers in neighborhoods of extreme 
poverty compared with fifteen percent of blacks.129 Compared to the HUD 
study, these post-Katrina data reveal that black voucher households in metro 
New Orleans are trending toward less extreme-poverty concentration even 
though there are still large numbers of vouchers (2,992) being used in extreme-
poverty neighborhoods.130 
The post-Katrina data also reveal that Hispanic household access to low-
poverty neighborhoods by 2010 in metro New Orleans was twelve percent; this 
is slightly better than blacks, but worse than whites. Hispanic representation in 
extreme-poverty neighborhoods, also twelve percent, was lower than blacks, 
but higher than whites.131 
2. Housing Voucher Use in Orleans Parish 
The question arises whether the tripling of vouchers in Orleans Parish 
resulted in voucher households settling in clustered patterns. An examination of 
voucher households reported by HUD in 2010 reveals that twenty-five percent 
of voucher households used them in five percent of the census tracts (for a total 
of 4,279 vouchers used in nine tracts). In each of these nine tracts, more than 
300 vouchers were used, which is triple the amount that would be present if 
vouchers were evenly distributed across all tracts. The number of vouchers 
appearing in these tracts ranged from 318 to 843.132 Seven of the nine census 
tracts are located in New Orleans East, six of the nine tracts in this group are in 
high-poverty areas, and all of them are in neighborhoods with fewer than 
twenty-five percent white residents.133 
When considering census tracts with 200 or more vouchers present, or 
double the amount of vouchers that would be present if evenly distributed, 
forty-two percent of vouchers are concentrated in thirteen percent of the census 
tracts (for a total of 7,320 vouchers used in twenty-two census tracts). Overall, 
nearly three-quarters of these census tracts are in high-poverty areas and more 
 
 129. Id. Nationally in 2010, the disparity was less stark but still notable, with about thirty percent of 
whites in metro areas able to access low-poverty neighborhoods compared with seventeen percent of 
blacks. McClure, supra note 5, at 221. 
 130. McClure contributed additional data analysis for this case study relating to HCV use at the 
metro New Orleans level; see supra note 128.  
 131. Id.; A Picture of Subsidized Households, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. (2000, 2010), 
http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/picture/about.html. McClure’s data also revealed that Hispanic 
households comprised less than one percent of voucher households in 2000, whereas they comprised 
four percent of voucher households in 2010. 
 132. See A Picture of Subsidized Households, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. (2010), 
http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/picture/about.html; U.S. Census Bureau: Census 2010, 
American Community Survey 2010 5-year estimates, http://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/ 
summary-file.2010.html. 
 133. HUD uses Census 2000 tracts to report 2010 voucher data, whereas this case study uses Census 
2010 census boundaries to report poverty and race data. Because some of the 2000 census boundaries 
changed in 2010, this case study defines a 2000 tract as high poverty if any part of the tract was a high-
poverty tract in 2010.  
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than three-quarters of them are in neighborhoods with fewer than twenty-five 
percent white residents. Maps accompanying an earlier release of this case study 
show the distribution of vouchers across all census tracts in Orleans Parish 
along with their corresponding poverty rates and percent white population.134 
John Lovett conducted an analysis of Orleans Parish voucher use at the 
neighborhood level using 2010 data supplied by the Louisiana Office of 
Community Development and the Data Center.135 He similarly found that “the 
ten New Orleans neighborhoods with the highest number of voucher 
households [ranging from 318 to 2,588 voucher holders] are overwhelmingly 
African American, while nine out of the ten neighborhoods with the lowest 
number of voucher households are predominantly white.”136 Lovett noted the 
need for “further investigation to understand the effect this voucher 
distribution surge is having on the quality of voucher holders’ lives and access to 
opportunity.”137 
The literature reports that clustered use of vouchers in general can result 
from “the manner through which voucher holders learn of available units and 
willing landlords.”138 The clustering of vouchers in narrow geographies of 
Orleans Parish underscores the need for recruitment of a broader pool of 
landlords in high-opportunity neighborhoods and better counseling and search 
assistance. Small landlord pools “relegate tenants, in effect, to a less competitive 
submarket of landlords.”139 
3. Market Limitations on Voucher Household Mobility 
It is easy to comprehend how the tripling in the number of vouchers used in 
Orleans Parish between 2000 and 2010 could contribute to limited choice of 
neighborhoods after Katrina. However, other market challenges also played a 
role. One expert observes greater entry into low-poverty census tracts “in soft 
[buyers’] markets and markets with a high percentage of total tracts that are 
low-poverty tracts.”140 New Orleans voucher holders have been disadvantaged 
because Orleans Parish has neither. 
 
 134. See Stacy Seicshnaydre & Ryan C. Albright, The New Orleans Index at Ten: Expanding Choice 
and Opportunity in the Housing Choice Voucher Program, July 2015, figs. 1 & 2, https://s3.amazon 
aws.com/gnocdc/reports/The+Data+CenterExpanding+Housing+Choice+in+New+ Orleans.pdf. HUD 
uses Census 2000 tracts to report the HUD Picture of Subsidized Housing for the year 2010. However, 
the Census Tract boundaries changed in Census 2010. To deal with this issue in the presentation of the 
maps, Census 2010 tracts were used to display the colors for the poverty and race data, then Census 
2000 tracts were layered over the Census 2010 tracts with a black outline but without fill colors; the 
Census 2000 tracts were then labeled with the HUD Housing Choice Voucher data.  
 135. John A. Lovett, Tragedy or Triumph in Post-Katrina New Orleans? Reflections on Possession, 
Dispossession, Demographic Change and Affordable Housing, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. CITY SQUARE 
22, 33 nn.62–63 (2013). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 35. 
 138. McClure, Schwartz, & Taghavi, supra note 10, at 217. 
 139. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 41.  
 140. McClure, supra note 5, at 209. 
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Post-Katrina estimates indicated that over half of the New Orleans region’s 
rental housing was destroyed.141 Given the decreased supply and low vacancy 
rates, there has been a significant increase in the share of renters who are cost-
burdened both at the metro and individual parish levels. The metro area saw an 
increase in households paying more than fifty percent of their household 
income on rent and utilities from twenty-two percent of such households in 
2004 to thirty-three percent in 2013.142 In Orleans Parish during the same time 
period, the percentage of severely cost-burdened renters increased from twenty-
four percent to thirty-seven percent, and in Jefferson Parish from twenty-two 
percent to thirty-four percent.143 The median gross rents between 2004 and 2013 
in the New Orleans metro rose from $760 to $908, in Orleans from $698 to $925, 
and in Jefferson from $807 to $876.144 
New Orleans is also disadvantaged because it has fewer low-poverty census 
tracts than the national average. In 2005 through 2009, the metro area had 126 
census tracts, or thirty-two percent, meeting the low-poverty threshold, 
compared with forty-four percent nationwide.145 The numbers are trending 
positively in the New Orleans metro, but trending negatively nationally.146 When 
considering the number of units in low-poverty neighborhoods with rents below 
the voucher payment standard, about half of the rental units qualified.147 
The scarcity of rental units, historically high-poverty rates, and the massive 
infusion of vouchers into the rental marketplace likely hampered voucher 
households’ overall access to high-opportunity neighborhoods in post-Katrina 
New Orleans. Another factor weighing heavily on the scale with respect to the 
housing mobility of voucher households is housing discrimination. 
4. Housing Discrimination as a Market Barrier: “Go Back to Your Section 8 
Home” 
As evidenced by the controversy surrounding a recent pool party in 
McKinney, Texas, in which a white resident is alleged to have stated to a black 
teen “Go back to your Section 8 home,”148 the stigma surrounding government 
 
 141. Turner, supra note 105, at 1 n.1. 
 142. NIHAL SHRINATH, VICKI MACK & ALLISON PLYER, THE DATA CTR., WHO LIVES IN NEW 
ORLEANS AND METRO PARISHES NOW? 15 (2014). 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. at 16. 
 145. Kirk McClure contributed additional data analysis for this case study based on U.S. Bureau of 
the Census: American Community Survey, 2005–2009. Because HUD used Census 2000 census tracts to 
depict HCV voucher use in 2010, and because some of these Census 2000 tracts changed in 2010, 
McClure used 2005–2009 American Community Survey data so that the census boundaries in his 
analysis would match the 2010 census boundaries used by HUD.    
 146. Kirk McClure contributed additional data analysis for this essay based on the U.S. Census 
Bureau: American Community Survey, 2005–2009. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Emily Badger, How Section 8 Became a ‘Racial Slur’: A History of Public Housing in America, 
WASH. POST (June 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/15/how-section-
8-became-a-racial-slur/. Media reports indicated that the police were called to the private pool party 
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housing programs persists. Allegations of harassment against Section 8 tenants 
by local governments have prompted HUD investigations.149 Section 8 is blamed 
for neighborhood changes even in places where few voucher families have 
entered.150 Research shows that small-scale, well-managed, subsidized housing 
does not harm receiving neighborhoods; it is rather the clustering of vouchers in 
high-poverty, minority neighborhoods that can be detrimental.151 
A significant barrier remains in the New Orleans metro with respect to 
discrimination against voucher users and differential access to rental housing 
opportunities generally on the basis of race. Given that over ninety percent of 
voucher users in the New Orleans metro in 2010 were black,152 the existence of 
rental discrimination on the basis of race serves as a real and persistent barrier 
to voucher users’ access to housing opportunity. When considering the 
prevalence of discrimination on the basis of voucher use, the barriers to 
opportunity for voucher holders in New Orleans appear particularly acute. 
Rental audits conducted by the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action 
Center (GNOFHAC) both before and after Katrina have used a method of 
investigation referred to as “testing.”153 This method engages matched pairs of 
testers posing as home seekers who are equally qualified to rent the advertised 
unit. Tester profiles and qualifications relevant to a rental transaction such as 
income, career path, family type, and rental history, are held constant; only one 
variable, such as race or voucher status, is measured.154 
A 2009 GNOFHAC audit measured landlord willingness to accept rental 
vouchers. The audit revealed that landlords either refused to accept vouchers or 
imposed insurmountable requirements for voucher holders in eighty-two 
percent of the one hundred rental tests conducted in the greater New Orleans 
area.155 
 
when it grew too large for the security guard to handle; video captured the responding officer using 
what appeared to be excessive force to detain a black female teen guest. Carol Cole-Frowe & Richard 
Fausset, Jarring Image of Police’s Use of Force at Texas Pool Party, N.Y. TIMES, (June 8, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/us/mckinney-tex-pool-party-dispute-leads-to-police-officer-
suspension.html.    
 149. See generally Jennifer Medina, Subsidies and Suspicion: Seeking a Better Life, California 
Renters Encounter Resistance, N.Y. TIMES, August. 11, 2011, at A12 (noting that HUD will investigate 
accusations of harassment against Section 8 tenants). 
 150. Badger, supra note 148.  
 151. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 55. 
 152. A Picture of Subsidized Households, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. (2000, 2010), 
http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/picture/about.html. 
 153. For background information on fair housing testing methodology, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, EVIDENCE MATTERS, PAIRED TESTING AND THE HOUSING 
DISCRIMINATION STUDIES (Spring/Summer 2014), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/ 
spring14/highlight2.html#title. 
 154. GREATER NEW ORLEANS FAIR HOUSING ACTION CENTER, WHERE OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS 
THE DOORS ARE LOCKED 11 (2014), www.gnofairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/11-06-14-
Where-Opp-Knocks-FINAL.pdf. 
 155. GREATER NEW ORLEANS FAIR HOUSING ACTION CENTER, HOUSING CHOICE IN CRISIS 
(2009), www.gnofairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/HousingChoiceInCrisis2009.pdf. 
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A November 2014 audit measuring race-based rental discrimination 
examined fifty advertised properties consisting of apartment complexes, multi-
family residences, and single-family homes located in Orleans Parish 
neighborhoods with fewer than thirty percent of families living in poverty.156 
The audit revealed that forty-four percent of African-American testers seeking 
rental housing in low-poverty neighborhoods received less favorable treatment 
than their white counterparts; this treatment included property owners and 
managers who refused to respond to inquiries or show the apartment, failed to 
provide rental applications, quoted less favorable terms and incentives, and 
imposed stricter standards.157 The 2014 audit, with its focus on access to low-
poverty neighborhoods, not only provides evidence that racial discrimination in 
the rental market persists, but also has troubling implications for the use of 
housing vouchers as a tool for upward socioeconomic mobility. Thus, both race-
based rental audits and voucher-based audits conducted post-Katrina in the 
region reflect market barriers that limit housing choice for those attempting to 
use vouchers to gain wider housing mobility and opportunity. 
A 2009 GNOFHAC study examining the location of landlord listings 
provided for voucher holders on HANO’s website demonstrated that sixty-two 
percent of one- and two-bedroom units and seventy-three percent of three-
bedroom units were located in neighborhoods designated as “low and very low” 
opportunity neighborhoods, when utilizing various indices of opportunity 
developed by the Kirwin Institute, including: educational quality, economic 
health and mobility, housing and neighborhood stability, public health access, 
and environmental quality.158 Although HANO does not guarantee the 
suitability of properties listed on its website for voucher use, the fact that rental 
units in low to very low opportunity neighborhoods are enjoying such 
prominent placement on HANO’s website is cause for concern. 
V 
TOOLS FOR REFORM 
The HCV Program has consistently fallen short of its potential to assist low-
income renters to access neighborhoods of greater opportunity. To that end, 
this article offers the following recommendations: 
A. Provide Data and Counseling Support 
It stands to reason that data and counseling can assist households to make 
housing choices that are informed by alternatives to high-poverty 
 
 156. GREATER NEW ORLEANS FAIR HOUSING ACTION CENTER, supra note 154, at 10.  
 157. Id. at 12–14. 
 158. GREATER NEW ORLEANS FAIR HOUSING ACTION CENTER, 2009 HOUSING CHOICE 
VOUCHER PROGRAM (HCV) OPPORTUNITY MAPPING PROJECT (2007), www.gnofairhousing.org 
/2009/12/07/opportunity-maps/. 
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neighborhoods.159 Successful mobility programs in Chicago, Dallas, and 
Baltimore have paved the way for promising practices to be replicated on a 
national basis.160 A robust counseling program would include effective 
administration of the HCV Program; recruitment and retention of landlords in 
high-opportunity neighborhoods; pre-move counseling to help families learn 
about unfamiliar neighborhoods and gain financial literacy; information about 
schools, transportation, employment opportunities, and other neighborhood 
resources; search assistance, including security deposit and transportation help; 
and post-move counseling and supports.161 To be sure, the term “opportunity 
neighborhoods” is not self-defining. Experts recommend avoiding proxies such 
as race and poverty levels, which do not necessarily account for neighborhoods 
in transition, and instead identifying multiple indicators of opportunity that 
would be tracked over time, such as school performance.162 
B. Set Fair Market Rates at the Neighborhood Level  
HUD should implement plans to set fair market rents at the neighborhood 
or zip-code level rather than at the metro level, thereby expanding housing 
choice and opportunity. 
C. Administer Vouchers at the Regional Level 
HUD has taken steps to make it easier for PHAs to form consortia so that 
vouchers may be administered regionally, though regional administration 
remains optional.163 Typically, vouchers are administered at the parish or county 
level, requiring any voucher holder wishing to cross parish lines to apply to 
multiple housing authorities with different offices and application procedures.164 
Moreover, the economies of scale introduced by regional administration could 
leverage the funding of multiple state and local jurisdictions to offset the costs 
associated with a robust counseling program. 
 
 159. An exhaustive review of the successful features of mobility programs designed to assist voucher 
households’ moves to neighborhoods of greater opportunity is beyond the scope of this article.  For a 
comprehensive set of materials reporting expert insights on mobility program barriers, design, and 
implementation, see PHILLIP TEGELER, MARY CUNNINGHAM, & MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER, 
POVERTY & RACE RES. ACTION COUNCIL, KEEPING THE PROMISE: PRESERVING AND ENHANCING 
HOUSING MOBILITY IN THE SECTION 8 HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM-CONFERENCE 
REPORT OF THE THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HOUSING MOBILITY (2005). 
 160. See Lora Engdahl & Philip Tegeler, Regional Housing Mobility: A Report from Baltimore, 18 
POVERTY & RACE at 1, 6–7 (2009). 
 161. Id.; Turner & Popkin, supra note 40, at 4; Turner, Williams, Kates, Popkin & Rabenhorst, 
supra note 105, at 22. 
 162. See Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 37 (noting the opportunity mapping strategies of the 
Kirwan Center [now Institute]); see also Engdahl & Tegeler, supra note 160, at 7 (noting that the 
poverty rate determinants of MTO did not by themselves ensure access to high-performing schools).  
 163. Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,322, 43,322–23 (July 16, 
2015) (“Program participants should determine whether they want to collaborate with other program 
participants and, if so, who they want to collaborate with.”). 
 164. See Darrah & DeLuca, supra note 95, at 27.  
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D. Combat Discrimination against Voucher Households 
Initiatives designed to combat housing discrimination should be supported, 
and protections from discrimination on the basis of voucher status should be 
implemented. One study found that voucher households in metro areas with 
source-of-income protection laws “are less racially segregated, and less 
clustered within specific census tracts, than [voucher] households in areas 
without such laws.”165 The new Assessment Tool required by HUD as part of a 
PHA’s AFH should lead to greater transparency as to where vouchers are being 
used in a region relative to demographic data and other indicators of 
opportunity. PHAs must monitor clustering and concentrations of vouchers and 
advocates must monitor PHAs to ensure the HCV Program is promoting 
housing choice throughout the region. 
E. Increase the Supply of Affordable Housing Units in High-Opportunity 
Neighborhoods 
Programs like the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program can amplify 
the impact of the HCV Program because tax-credit properties cannot 
discriminate on the basis of voucher use. The greater number of tax-credit units 
that are built in neighborhoods of opportunity, with access to jobs, good 
schools, and healthy environments, the greater access to these neighborhoods 
by HCV households. Also, placing affordable rental units under management 
by a socially responsible third party could serve as another supply-side strategy 
in urban and suburban neighborhoods with barriers to affordable housing 
development or with landlords unwilling to deal directly with a housing 
authority.166 Recruiting a broad pool of landlords is, therefore, especially vital. 
F. Create a More Balanced Fair Housing Policy 
In the current budgetary climate, the sure response to any recommended 
fair housing reforms of the HCV program is that there is a lack of resources. 
Mobility and housing choice expenditures, however, have been dwarfed by fifty 
years of revitalization policies that some scholars and advocates describe as 
“yield[ing] very little durable progress.”167 The above proposals for regional 
administration would create efficiencies generating more funds for mobility 
counseling. A more balanced funding apparatus that set aside at least some 
annual funding for mobility programs without the need for litigation is 
 
 165. Metzger, supra note 8, at 545. See Tamica H. Daniel, Bringing Real Choice to the Housing 
Choice Voucher Program: Addressing Voucher Discrimination Under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 98 
GEORGETOWN L.J. 769, 777–79 (2010) (discussing the strengths and limitations of statutes and 
ordinances prohibiting source-of-income-discrimination). 
 166. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 41. 
 167. See Alex Polikoff, Housing Mobility: Why Is It So Controversial?, 24 POVERTY & RACE 3, 4 
(2015) (borrowing a phrase from Pat Sharkey and responding to objection that spending money on 
mobility means serving fewer families).  
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recommended.168 Policy experts have recommended a set aside of “opportunity 
vouchers” to help those low-income families living in the most segregated 
regions of the country, who would like to move, exercise the choice to enter 
communities with low poverty and high-performing schools.169 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
This post-Katrina case study substantiates the notion that persistent 
structural flaws in the HCV Program must be corrected if the program is to 
further fair housing and reach its full potential. Both before and after Hurricane 
Katrina, voucher households in the New Orleans metro had less access than 
their national counterparts to low-poverty neighborhoods of opportunity.170 
Racial disparities in access to low-poverty neighborhoods also persist in the 
New Orleans HCV Program, and studies have documented discrimination 
against both African Americans and voucher households generally.171 Despite 
large numbers of vouchers still in use in extreme-poverty neighborhoods, the 
trends are encouraging at the metro level, with higher percentages of black 
voucher households in 2010 using vouchers in low-poverty census tracts than 
reported in the pre-Katrina HUD Study, and a sharp drop in the percentage of 
black voucher households living in neighborhoods of extreme poverty.172 Still, 
many readily available policy tools exist to counteract the tendency of voucher 
families to cluster in certain tracts, as is happening in Orleans Parish with 
twenty-five percent of the vouchers in 2010 used in a mere five percent of 
census tracts.173 The stakes are high for low-income children in the New Orleans 
region and elsewhere. The HCV Program must achieve its original purpose of 
reducing isolation of low-income renters and assist the next generation to 
overcome the life-altering effects of poverty. 
 
 168. See, e.g., Elizabeth Julian, Mobility Works America, 24 POVERTY & RACE 1 (2015) (proposing 
that mobility programs borrow funding model from “NeighborWorks America,” a community 
development granting and training organization funded at over $200 million in 2012–2013).   
 169. Engdahl & Tegeler, supra note 160, at 6–7. 
 170. See supra notes 113–116; 122–125 and accompanying text. 
 171. See supra notes 119, 128 & Section III.C.4 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra notes 116, 124, 130 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra note 132 & Part IV. 
